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This exploratory study sought to identify the factors important to large improvement in workplace occu-
pational health and safety (OHS) performance. Mixed methods were used to systematically identify 12
organizations in a workers’ compensation database that had made large and intentional improvement
in workplace OHS performance in Ontario, Canada, during 1998–2008 (i.e., ‘‘breakthrough change”
(BTC) cases). Four of these organizations were selected for in-depth case study (two manufacturers, a gro-
cery and a social agency). Cross-case analysis and consideration of existing literature led to a 12-element
conceptual model with organizational learning at its core. Four elements were involved in the initiation
of BTC: external influence, organizational motivation to improve OHS, new OHS knowledge and a knowl-
edge transformation leader. Five other elements were involved in the process of BTC: responsiveness to
OHS concerns, positive social dynamics, continuous improvement pattern, simultaneous operational
improvement, and supportive internal context. Finally, three elements are outcomes of BTC: integrated
OHS knowledge, decreased OHS risk, and decreased injury and illness. These concepts can be used in
future research regarding workplace improvement in OHS performance.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Although the rates of work-related injuries and physical ill-
nesses have declined over the past two decades in developed coun-
tries, uncertainty remains about the mix of strategies regulatory
authorities should use for further reduction. For decision-makers
within workplaces, there is still a need to learn what specific steps
should be undertaken to improve OHS outcomes. This exploratory
multiple case study addresses gaps of knowledge in these areas bycontributing to new theoretical development regarding how and
why organizations improve in OHS performance.
Research has provided much information about the determi-
nants of organizational performance in OHS, most often from
cross-sectional studies. Important determinants include OHS man-
agement (e.g., Cullen et al., 2005; Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2009;
Gallagher and Underhill, 2012; Hale and Hovden, 1998; Robson
et al., 2007; Shannon et al., 1997), leadership in OHS (e.g., Barling
et al., 2002; Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Kelloway et al.,
2006; Zacharatos et al., 2005; Zohar, 2002), employee participation
in OHS (e.g., Aksorn and Hadikusumo, 2008; Christian et al., 2009;
Shannon et al., 1997); safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000) and
safety climate (e.g., Beus et al., 2010; Neal and Griffin, 2006;
Zohar and Luria, 2005). Much less is known about determinants
and mechanisms of OHS performance improvement. We would
expect the two sets of determinants to overlap, but not necessarily
be the same. Some determinants may be particularly important to
improvement. Whereas the management and organizational liter-
atures have many theories and models regarding organizational
change to improve workplace performance (reviewed below), the
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improvement in OHS performance. This study aims to address that
weakness.
OHS intervention studies certainly contribute to the knowledge
base about factors important in workplace change, but they usually
have a narrow focus on a particular type of intervention. In con-
trast, the starting point in the present research was the outcome
of interest – large improvement – and we sought to understand
what explains this improvement. Our primary research objective
was to identify the factors important to large workplace improve-
ment in OHS performance. The long term aim is to generate knowl-
edge applicable to the design of OHS regulatory systems and to
workplaces seeking improvement in OHS. This research studied a
varied group of workplaces that underwent large improvement,
and derived a common set of explanatory factors. Based on these,
we propose a model of ‘‘breakthrough change” in workplace OHS
performance that has organizational learning at its core.2. Theory
Here we review organizational change theory, which informed
our data collection and analysis. We then review concepts from
the organizational learning and positive organizational scholarship
field, which aided our interpretation of the research findings.2.1. Organizational change theory
The OHS field has previously benefited from transferring or
adapting concepts first described and studied in the organizational
literature. For example, safety climate research was based on prior
work on organizational climate (Zohar, 1980). The literature on
(generic) organizational change, which is defined as ‘‘a difference
in form, quality, or state over time in an organizational entity”
(Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, p. 512), may therefore be relevant
to organizational change specific to workplace OHS performance.
The literature is vast, but reviews have been provided by Burke
(2008), Martins (2011), Van de Ven and Poole (1995), and Weick
and Quinn (1999). The review by Armenakis and Bedeian (1999)
organizes the literature into three conceptual streams and advo-
cates that all three perspectives be included in subsequent
research. One stream is concerned with how the external context
(e.g. government regulations) or internal context (e.g. size) influ-
ences the nature or degree of organizational change (e.g.,
Damanpour, 1991). Another stream is concerned with the content
of change; i.e., which organizational features (e.g. structure, leader-
ship) should be targeted by change initiatives to achieve intended
outcomes (e.g., Burke and Litwin, 1992). Finally, the process-
oriented literature considers the sequence of actions an organiza-
tion must take to make change (e.g., Lewin, 1947; Kotter, 1995).2.2. Organizational learning theory
Organizational learning is sometimes seen as a sub-field of the
organizational change field (e.g., Martins, 2011). It is concerned
with an organization’s acquisition of new knowledge, its distribu-
tion, interpretation, and retention (Huber, 1991), as well as its
impacts. Reviews are provided by Argote and Miron-Spektor
(2011), Huber (1991), Schulz (2002), and van Wijk et al. (2008).
Although organizational learning may involve changes in individ-
ual cognitions, the primary emphasis is on changes in organiza-
tional routines, which are ‘‘recurrent sequences of action that
span multiple organizational actors and assets,” such as ‘‘organiza-
tional rules, roles, conventions, strategies, structures, technologies,
cultural practices and capabilities” (Schulz, 2002, p. 415).2.3. Application of organizational change and learning theories to OHS
The application of organizational learning concepts to OHS has
been slow to develop. Gherardi and Nicolini (2000) and Broberg
and Hermund (2004) drew from the field of sociology of science
and technology, including actor-network theory, to consider how
external actors (e.g. OHS consultants) transfer knowledge to orga-
nizations. Broberg and Hermund (2004) identified three roles for
consultants: technical expert, process consultant who helps sup-
port internal development in OHS, and ‘‘political reflective naviga-
tor” who is ‘‘active in building and stabilizing networks [of actors
and artefacts] to support the integration of work environment
aspects into technological change.” Hasle and Jensen (2006) pro-
posed a model of change management in OHS, drawing from the-
ories of organizational learning, power, and change management.
Drupsteen et al. (2013) introduced a model of learning from safety
incidents by combining safety professional opinion and more gen-
eral organizational learning concepts.
The application of other types of organizational change theories
to OHS is limited. Carrillo (2011) discussed how complexity con-
cepts could be applied to OHS, and Nielsen (2014) carried out a
workplace intervention based on such concepts. Other OHS inter-
vention literature is either atheoretical or uses theories with a
focus on the individual, rather than on the organization
(Goldenhar and Schulte, 1994; Kristensen, 2005; Wijk and
Mathiassen, 2011).2.4. Positive Organizational Scholarship (POS)
Another body of literature found relevant to the interpretation
of our research findings is known as Positive Organizational Schol-
arship (POS). This emerged recently as a distinct field (Cameron
et al., 2003; Cameron and Spreitzer, 2012; Caza and Cameron,
2009; Center for Positive Organizations, 2014). It is ‘‘concerned pri-
marily with the study of especially positive outcomes, processes,
and attributes of organizations” (Cameron, 2008, p. 1261). As such,
the field encompasses and builds upon relevant existing theories
and practices, such as the job characteristics model and apprecia-
tive inquiry, as well as newer developments. Associations between
positive phenomena and positive outcomes are of particular inter-
est. One notable focus in the field is organizational energy (Cole
et al., 2012; Spreitzer et al., 2012; Vogel and Bruch, 2012), which
appears to be important for organizational coordination (Quinn
and Dutton, 2005), organizational performance (Cole et al., 2012)
and organizational change (Jansen, 2004). This energy is generated
in part through positive interactions with others (Baker et al.,
2003; Feldman and Khademian, 2003; Quinn and Dutton, 2005).
Another focus in the POS field of particular relevance to the pre-
sent research is ‘‘positive deviance,” which is ‘‘intentional behav-
iors that depart from the norms of a reference group in
honorable ways” (Spreitzer and Sonenshein, 2004, p. 832). An
intervention approach, known as ‘‘positive deviance strategy,”
has been shown to be successful in various fields of health and in
other types of workplace changes (Lavine, 2012; Marsh et al.,
2004; Pascale and Sternin, 2005; Spreitzer and Sonenshein,
2003). This strategy involves identifying positive deviance in a
population of individuals or organizations, understanding the basis
of the deviance, and then applying the gained knowledge to others
in the population for their benefit. There has been little overlap of
the POS and OHS literature to date.3. Methods
Drawing upon the methods of Eisenhardt (1989) and Miles and
Huberman (1994), a multiple case study approach was used for
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performance. This approach can be expected to yield ‘‘concepts, a
conceptual framework, or propositions or possibly mid-range the-
ory” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 545). The cases of interest, those making
large and intentional improvement, were identified within a popu-
lation of firms using a systematic mixed-method process. All meth-
ods were approved by the Health Sciences Research Ethics Board at
the University of Toronto.3.1. Mixed-method identification of BTC cases
The study population was defined using workers’ compensation
administrative records from the Workplace Safety and Insurance
Board (WSIB) of the province of Ontario, Canada. The WSIB admin-
isters a sole provider workers’ compensation scheme for injuries,
illnesses or fatalities caused or aggravated by work conditions,
excluding most mental health conditions. The initial population
(n = 3590 firms) consisted of all collectively insured (‘‘Schedule
1”) employers that had 75 or more full-time equivalents (FTEs)
annually during 1998–2008 and that were still in existence in
2009. Schedule 1 includes all establishments in the sectors of for-
estry products, mining, agriculture, fishing, construction, manufac-
turing, and wholesale & retail trade, as well as some
establishments in the sectors of transportation & storage, educa-
tion, energy, health care, government, and other services. Next,
all firms in industrial sub-sectors containing fewer than 20 of the
above firms were excluded to enhance the reliability of percentile
rankings of firms within sub-sectors, leaving 2599 firms.
A three-step mixed-method process, developed with the
involvement of a senior biostatistician on the research team, was
then used to identify organizations that had made large and inten-
tional improvement in workplace OHS performance (‘‘break-
through change” (BTC) cases) during 1998–2008. First, using
computational methods, the WSIB insurance claim records (con-
cerning both lost-time and no-lost-time injuries or illnesses) of
the 2599 firms were screened to find firms that had undergone a
large change during 1998–2008; that is, from being among the
50% with the highest workers’ compensation claim rates within
their respective industrial sub-sector in the pre-change period, to
being among the 20% with the lowest claim rates in the post-
change period. To help ensure this was a stable change and not
random variation, a minimum of three (and up to seven) years of
data were used for each of the pre- and post-change periods. As
well, during the change period (i.e. the time intervening between
the pre- and post-change periods), the claim rate for each year
and on average was required to be between the pre- and post-
change averages. From the eligible pool of 2599 firms, only 67
firms met the above quantitative change criteria.
However, the claim-rate-versus-time plots for these 67 firms
appeared in some cases to still have excessive noise in the data,
so it was the consensus of the research team, that a modified Del-
phi process step be undertaken next. For each of the 67 firms, team
members with quantitative training reviewed tabular data (includ-
ing annual claim rate and coefficient of variation for every possible
three- to seven- year pre- and post-change period) and graphical
displays (claims, FTEs, and claim rate versus time; and claim rate
versus time with curved regression line, fitted using the PROC
LOESS function in SAS statistical software). These team members
were then asked to judge whether a particular firm had demon-
strated change (yes, no or unsure options in the first round; yes
or no options in second round). After two rounds of the modified
Delphi process, 32 firms were selected. These were quite similar
to the initial group of 2599 in size and sector. The median size was
209 FTEs for the initial group and 208 FTEs for the 32-firm group.
Manufacturing, services and health care were most predominantin both groups (31%, 35% and 21% of firms, respectively, in the
initial group; and 50%, 34% and 12% in the group of 32 firms).
In the third step of the identification process, attempts were
made to recruit each of the 32 selected firms to take part in a brief
interview, which sought an explanation for the observed large
decline in WSIB claims rate. Not-for-profit, sector-based health
and safety associations (HSAs), which provide education and con-
sultation services to the firms within an industrial sector, part-
nered with researchers to recruit selected firms for a brief
interview. Multiple contact attempts were made by telephone
and e-mail. Ultimately, 15 organizations participated in a brief
interview, six refused, and 11 did not respond. Interviews were
requested with a person knowledgeable about the decline in work-
ers’ compensation rates. The respondents had been with the orga-
nization for an average of 14 years and most frequently held a
position involving occupational health/safety (n = 9) or a Human
Resources position (n = 3). The brief interview was semi-
structured. Questions sought to determine whether there had been
intentional workplace efforts to improve OHS, and explored alter-
native explanations for the observed rate decline, such as reducing
risk through changes in production technology for non-OHS rea-
sons, a change in reporting, an outsourcing of risk, or a re-
organization. The interview also sought detail on the sequence of
actions that led to improvement in OHS outcomes and on the moti-
vation for the organization making changes. Immediately following
the brief interview, a formal note was written and its content
coded by two researchers. As well, two critical determinations
were made: (i) whether the observed claim rate decline was due
to a true reduction in OHS risk in essentially the same establish-
ment, rather than, for example, outsourcing risk or merging orga-
nizations; and (ii) whether the improvement in OHS was
intentional or a by-product of action taken for other means (e.g.
automation to improve production, not to improve OHS). Twelve
organizations were identified whose improvement had been inten-
tional and without a fundamental change to the organizational
entity. These became the study’s 12 BTC cases. (Of the remaining
three organizations interviewed, one had reduced OHS risk unin-
tentionally, another had eliminated the higher risk jobs through
a reorganization, and in the third, the organizational history was
not known by the respondent.)
3.2. Case selection for in-depth study
Four organizations were purposefully selected (Patton, 1987)
from the pool of 12 BTC cases to participate in an in-depth case
study. Three teammembers made this decision through consensus.
One aim in the selection was to have a diversity of sectors repre-
sented, since the work was exploratory and sought findings that
could transcend sector. Within-sector choices among firms consid-
ered the following:
 Whether the organizational efforts to improve OHS, as
described in the brief screening interview, preceded the
observed decline in claim rate.
 Whether a key informant with institutional memory about OHS
would be available during case study data collection.
 Strength of firm-level quantitative data (including statistical
significance and magnitude of relative change e.g. from 80th
to 20th percentile).
The statistical significance of the change in claim rate over
1998–2008 was determined for each case using negative binomial
regression modeling of annual claims, with the logarithm of FTEs
as the offset variable. Observations from 2006 to 2008 (end of
the post-BTC period common to all cases) were contrasted with
those from 1998 to 2000 (start of the pre-BTC period common to
Table 1
Characteristics of the workplace respondents.
Respondent characteristic Description of characteristic among respondents
Occupational roles (number of respondents) Front-line worker (n = 11)
Front-line supervisor/coordinator (n = 5)
Line manager (n = 6)
Senior line manager (n = 4)
Other (n = 7)
Formal OHS roles (number of respondents) Job title included ‘‘safety” (n = 2)
Other joint health and safety committee (JHSC)a members (n = 11)
Age 40s (median)
Late 20s to late 50s (range)
Tenure 16 years (median)
5–33 years (range)
Gender (number of respondents) Female (n = 9)
Male (n = 24)
a Joint health and safety committees (JHSCs) are required by OHS legislation in most Ontario work sites with 20 or more employees.
They include one or more employer representatives and one or more worker representatives.
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the model; and the statistical significance of this variable’s coeffi-
cient was determined. The first four firms selected by researchers
all agreed to participate.3.3. Data collection
In late 2010 and early 2011, two researchers visited the four
workplaces, three for a two-day visit (Metal Products, Plastics,
Social Agency) and one for a one-day visit (Grocery). Interviews
were sought with people at all organizational levels and in a vari-
ety of roles, including those related to OHS and operations.
Researchers provided a list of 11 potential roles of interest (e.g.,
senior executive most familiar with OHS strategy, human
resources manager, joint health and safety committee members,
operations manager/supervisor, operations workers) and indicated
a preference for long-tenure employees. The key informant
recruited and scheduled interviewees accordingly. Thirty-three
one-hour audio-recorded interviews were conducted across the
four sites (nine to ten during the two-day visits and four during
the one-day visit). A summary of respondent characteristics is
shown in Table 1.
The semi-structured interview covered the following topics:
 Background of respondent, especially in the organization and in
OHS.
 Nature of OHS risks in the workplace.
 Explanation of why WSIB claim rates declined.
 (Changes in) organizational activities to prevent work-related
injury and illness.
 Barriers to and facilitators of these activities and initiatives.
 (Changes in) management of WSIB injury claims.
 (Changes in) other aspects of the core business potentially rele-
vant to claims outcomes.
A tour of the work site was provided by the key informant, dur-
ing which researchers observed the work environment and the
activities of employees. The informant highlighted OHS features
of the site and how these had changed over time.
The workplaces were asked to provide documents related to
OHS (e.g., OHS plans and reports, OHS policies and procedures, sta-
tistical summaries of injuries and illnesses); several from each site
were reviewed. Archival data was retrieved for all sites from WSIB
(claims) and the Ministry of Labour (enforcement activity). Fieldnotes were made by each interviewer about the tour, observations
of the premises, interviewees, and the documents reviewed on site.
Five supplementary telephone interviews were also conducted.
Two were with current and former consultants with a Health &
Safety Association that provided services to one of the workplaces
and played a large role in change. Three were with key informants
in three of the cases, during the analysis process, to clarify points of
uncertainty.
3.4. Data analysis
Within-case analysis was conducted for each case, followed by a
cross-case analysis of all four cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and
Huberman, 1994). After a training period to ensure a shared under-
standing of the coding scheme, interview transcripts were coded
sequentially by two researchers and a synthetic memo was created
for each. As recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994) a provi-
sional list of codes based on the team’s prior conceptual under-
standing was created and then added to as required. The coding
scheme, comprising of 37 pre-existing and five emergent codes,
directed attention to OHS and the OHS system (e.g., OHS culture,
OHS leadership, OHS structure, OHS participation, OHS risks), the
process of any changes in these over time (e.g. barrier, champion,
coalition, trigger), causality related to changes in organizational
OHS performance (e.g. confounder, key causal), as well as the
broader internal and external contexts for the organization. Next,
for each case, all data sources (including transcripts, field notes,
organizational documents, and memos) were reduced and inte-
grated using two techniques: a matrix with time in one dimension
and broad concepts in the other (Miles and Huberman, 1994), fol-
lowed by an organizational narrative. This integration necessitated
developing a consensus narrative, with greater weight given to
information corroborated by multiple respondents, and the preser-
vation of any important disagreements. Finally, a table of case-
specific BTC ‘‘factors” (themes) and an assessment of their impor-
tance to BTC (very high, high, moderate, and possible) were derived
from the narrative, with assigned importance reflective of the
strength of the evidence. A factor was defined as an aspect of the con-
text, process and content of the BTC that (potentially) contributed to
its occurrence. From 26 to 42 within-case factors were identified
for each case. Four additional teammembers, from a variety of aca-
demic backgrounds and not involved in the data collection or cod-
ing, were involved as reviewers of the within-case analyses, which
helped ensure data were thoroughly and appropriately analyzed.
Specifically, for each case, two team members reviewed the final
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Fig. 1. Claims per 100 FTE, expressed as a percentage of the organization’s maximum over 1998–2010.
L.S. Robson et al. / Safety Science 86 (2016) 211–227 215narrative in relation to the source transcripts, as well as the table of
case-specific BTC factors in relation to the narrative from which
they were derived. Disagreements in interpretation and omissions
of content were sought and resolved.
The cross-case analysis, carried out by two team members,
derived cross-case factors (‘‘themes”) from the case-specific fac-
tors, using the following criteria: a cross-case factor needed to be
of at least moderate importance to BTC in three or four cases and
there could be no case providing clearly contradictory evidence
regarding that factor. Cross-case factors were usually at a higher
level of generalization or abstraction than the within-case factors
on which they were based. An initial set of 57 cross-case factors
with much conceptual overlap was aggregated until 11 were
derived. Concurrently, a conceptual model was created from these
11 cross-case factors; the final outcome of decreased injury and ill-
ness, on which the cases had been selected, was also included.
Overall, analysis was an iterative process involving the research
data and existing theory (Andersen and Kragh, 2010; Eisenhardt,
1989; Sandelowski, 1993). The OHS management and organiza-
tional change literatures generally informed the prior knowledge
of researchers and led to many of the pre-existing codes used in
the early steps of data analysis. Later in the analysis, concepts from
the positive organizational scholarship and organizational learning
literatures informed the aggregation of cross-case factors into a
final model. This ‘‘tying [of the] emergent theory to existing litera-
ture enhances the internal validity, generalizability, and theoretical
level of theory building from case study research” (Eisenhardt
1989, p. 545).4. Results
4.1. Results from the BTC case identification step
The computational, Delphi, and brief interview screening steps
identified 12 cases of ‘‘breakthrough” change from the initial pool
of 2599 firms; i.e. cases of large and intentional improvement.
These firms came from manufacturing (n = 7), community & healthcare services (n = 3) and other services (n = 2) and had a median of
186 FTEs in size. The brief screening interviews with organizational
key contacts revealed details about the most common types of
changes believed to be responsible for OHS improvement (see
Table A1 in Appendix A). They were varied in nature. Most fre-
quently occurring were improvement in education/training in pri-
mary prevention (n = 10), obtaining external OHS expertise (n = 9),
adding OHS personnel through hiring or reassignment (n = 8), tool/
equipment/machinery changes (n = 7) and enhancement of return-
to-work programs (n = 7). Most changes reported by respondents
were purposeful actions taken by the organization, but there was
some mention of phenomena that happened in conjunction with
or in reaction to the various organizational initiatives related to
OHS (e.g., the joint health and safety committee becoming more
active/intense (n = 6) and culture change (n = 6)). Notably, no cases
of narrowly scoped interventions were reported responsible for the
changes in claim rates; instead, firms initiated between six to 12
changes to bring about OHS improvements. All cases focused on
primary prevention, i.e., preventing the occurrence of illness and
injury; seven also focused on secondary prevention, i.e., preventing
harm from occurring following injury or illness (e.g. return-to-
work initiative).4.2. Brief description of the four BTC cases studied in-depth
The purposeful selection of four cases for in-depth study yielded
a manufacturer of metal products, a manufacturer of plastics, a
food retailer franchise, and a social agency that operates group
homes and provides community services. The latter was a multi-
site entity within one city, whereas the other three were a single
site of a national or multi-national corporation. The number of
employees for each case ranged from 60 to 210. Two cases were
unionized and two were non-unionized. The food retailer com-
menced operation in 1997, whereas the other entities had been
established one or more decades earlier. The 1998–2010 claim rate
trajectories of selected firms are shown in Fig. 1. That of Metal
Products shows more rapid change, while the others show more
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Fig. 2. Model of the breakthrough change process.
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p = 0.05 for Grocery and p < 0.0001 for the other cases.
4.3. Results from the in-depth multiple case study analysis
As described in the methods, aggregation of thematic material
arising from the in-depth qualitative data and interaction with
existing theory led to a 12-element conceptual model of the break-
through change (BTC) process (Fig. 2). The transformation of OHS
knowledge is at the model’s core: i.e., before BTC, the knowledge
is unknown and external to the organization; by the end, it is inte-
grated within the organization. Each of the model’s elements is
listed and defined in Table 2. The relationship between the ele-
ments and the case study evidence is summarized. The 12 ele-
ments are elaborated upon and related to the underlying case
material in the remainder of the Results section. We start with
the four elements found to be necessary for the initiation of BTC
(external influence, organizational motivation, new OHS knowl-
edge and knowledge transformation leader (KTL)), follow with five
other elements important for the occurrence of BTC (responsive-
ness to OHS concerns, positive social dynamics, continuous
improvement pattern, simultaneous operational improvement,
and supportive internal context), and end with the three outcome
elements (integrated OHS knowledge, decreased OHS risk, and
decreased injury & illness).
4.3.1. External influence and organizational motivation
Across the cases, a wide variety of external influences were
found to be important in the initiation of breakthrough change,
including the government inspectorate, industry requirements,
and a serious injury in a similar business (see Table 3). The external
influences increased the motivation of organizations to improve in
OHS, as illustrated here:
It happened in another store and I remember thinking ‘If it was
me, how would it impact my business?’ And that’s where the
light went on.3 And the injury specifically . . . I believe it was a
[young worker] . . . it was pretty serious. . . .I was just worried3 Italics within quotes are used by the authors to emphasize the key segments of
text.
4
iden
com
worthat, you know, if one of my employees got hurt – if there was
a fatality or there was some kind of serious injury, you know,
what would that do to the business? What would it do to me?
You know, howwould it impact how we do business today, right?
And, you know, you want a peace of mind that what you’re doing,
you know, that I have – all the due diligence is there on my
part. . . We tried for a year or two to try and do it on our own,
and we found that we were still not getting to where we needed
to be, and at the same time . . . there was a couple of [grocery]
stores that had received Workwells [mandatory audits by the
workers’ compensation agency] and judging by their scores I
knew that we wouldn’t do well either, so that was even more of
a catalyst to get involved with [the private sector OHS
consultant].P144.3.2. New OHS knowledge
New OHS knowledge, particularly regarding OHS management
and risk control, started to move into the organizations shortly
before or during BTC initiation. The avenues for this knowledge
influx were primarily through relationships with external manage-
ment consultants or the hiring of new personnel (see Table 3 for
more details of each case). In only one case (Metal Products), a spe-
cialist with formal education in OHS was hired. In the other cases,
non-specialists within the organizations were newly given or
already had responsibility for overseeing OHS activities, but for
them, relationships with public or private management consul-
tants were an important or critical source of new OHS knowledge:
[the consultant’s] involvement with the organization just pro-
vided us with a wealth of knowledge and started to get us to
think about a lot of issues.P24.3.3. Knowledge transformation leader (KTL)
The KTL was a key figure in the initiation of BTC. He or she
orchestrated the transformation of new OHS knowledge to inte-
grated internal knowledge. This was done by developing policiesQuotes from 15 participants are included in the article. Each is assigned an
tifier shown in the subscript following the quote. The quoted participants
prise 9 managers/supervisors, 5 workers, and 1 external consultant. All four
kplaces are represented.
Table 2
BTC model elements identified through case study analysis and their representation in each case.
BTC model elements Definition Role in the BTC process model Element represented in case
Metal
products
Plastics Grocery Social
agency
External influence Conditions and actors, external to the organization, that help initiate BTC External factor that brings one or more of the
internal initiation factors into play, especially
organizational motivation
Y Y Y Y
Organizational motivation Motivation of the organization to improve OHS Internal initiation factor – required for initiation
(and completion) of BTC
Y Y Y Y
New OHS knowledge OHS knowledge that, prior to BTC, was unknown to the organization Internal initiation factor – required for initiation
(and completion) of BTC
Y Y Y Y
Knowledge transformation leader (KTL) The internal person who orchestrates the transformation of New OHS Knowledge to
Integrated OHS Knowledge
Internal initiation factor – required for initiation
(and completion) of BTC
Y Y Y Y
Responsiveness to OHS concerns Responsiveness of the organization towards employees’ OHS concerns Enhances employees’ participation in OHS Y Y Y ?
Positive social (and psychological)
dynamics
Social and psychological processes with beneficial outcomes for the individual and
organization, such as energizing interactions, rapport, collaboration, worker
empowerment and development through OHS, and passion for and commitment to OHS
Enhances inter- and intra-organizational transfer
of knowledge
Y Y ? Y
Continuous improvement pattern A pattern of ongoing improvement in OHS management and risk control over time Pattern of organizational effort required for BTC Y Y Y Y
Simultaneous improvement in operations Improvements in the operations (i.e., core tasks) of the organization; e.g., initiatives in
‘‘lean,” quality and organizational excellence
Decreases OHS risk directly and indirectly Y Y ? Y
Supportive internal context Non-OHS aspects of the organization supportive of change in OHS Allows or even facilitates the occurrence of BTC Y Y Y Y
Integrated OHS knowledge New OHS knowledge embedded in responsibilities, policies, procedures, practices,
documentation, as well as individual knowledge
Ensures that improved OHS management and
risk control endures in the organization
Y Y Y Y
Decreased OHS risk Decreased risk arising from OHS hazards Proximal determinant of occupational injury and
illness
Y Y Y Y
Decreased injury and illness Decreased rate of occupational injury and illness among employees Final outcome Y Y Y Y
‘‘Y” indicates that there was case evidence supportive of the element being present in the case; ‘‘?” indicates that there was a lack of evidence in the case about either the presence or absence of the element in the case.
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Table 3
Summary of case evidence related to the elements of model involved in initiation of the BTC process.
External influences, major Organizational motivation in OHS OHS knowledge transformation leader (KTL) New OHS knowledge
Metal products 2. In 2005, because non-compliance orders from
3 months prior had not been addressed, the
Ministry of Labour inspector contacted cor-
porate head office, which pressured plant
manager to take more action on OHS, leading
to the hiring of the first HSE coordinator.
1. A new plant manager, brought in by the rela-
tively new corporate management in 2004,
increased the emphasis on plant performance
improvements in various areas, including
OHS, but without noticeable results in OHS
in 2004–5.
3. In response to corporate pressure, the plant
manager decided to hire the first HSE coordi-
nator for the site.
4. An HSE coordinator, the first ever, was hired
in February 2006. She had strong administra-
tive and people skills. She was highly moti-
vated to succeed, since it was her first
position after obtaining a college education
and an opportunity to advance from a worker
role (in another workplace).
5. TheHSE coordinator had post-secondary cre-
dential in OHS and also drew from outside
OHS resources as required, e.g. manufactur-
ing consortium, external ergonomics consul-
tant. There was an OHS manual from the
mandatory Workwell audita intervention in
2002–3 to build upon.
Plastics 1. A mandatory Workwell audita in 1996/7 led
to interaction with a public sector consul-
tant, to pass the 2nd audit (after failing in first
attempt).
3. Companies in the industry ‘‘just want com-
panies that [have] a good safety program or
a good safety culture that they want to deal
with.”
4. Organization was newly motivated in OHS by
industry requirements in the late 1990s.
5. New organizational motivation in OHS led to
adding OHS to a process engineer’s job
responsibilities for the first time in the late
1990s. From then and through the 2000s, he
spent about 50% of his time on OHS in the
2000s. He was a well-liked long-time
employee with both administrative and peo-
ple skills.
2. Interactions with a public sector consultant,
first arising from mandatory audit, and again
after becoming motivated in OHS led to the
development of an OHS manual in the later
1990s.
6. Some new senior expertise in process man-
ufacturing was hired at the corporate level in
the late 1990s which led to enhanced OHS
management with the introduction of perfor-
mance metrics, external benchmarking, safety
in performance reviews, and more safety
training.
Grocery 1. In early 2000s, the owner learned through
business contacts that grocery stores like his
were failing the mandatory Workwell audit.a
2. In early 2000s, the owner learned through
business contacts that a very serious injury
occurred to a young worker in a grocery sim-
ilar to his.
3. The ‘‘light went on” for the owner in the early
2000s upon learning about the injury in
another grocery and he decided to improve
organization’s OHS. He then attempted and
failed to do this until assisted by a consultant.
5. The owner was the primary KTL for first sev-
eral years, while establishing program with
consultant. A successful franchisee owner, he
has demonstrated leadership skills and is
well-liked.
6. In later years, an assistant with strong admin-
istrative skills is assigned to the KTL role.
4. Starting in 2003, the owner worked with a
private consultant intensively to put an
OHS program in place, seeking to meet the
Workwell standard.
Social agency 2. By 1999, workers’ compensation insurance
surcharges arising from high injury experi-
ence were noticed by senior management.
3. Public sector consultant was ‘‘really the big-
gest and most important driving force over
the years,” starting in 2000 and continuing
through the 2000s.
4. After interaction with OHS consultant in 2000,
people realized ‘‘geez, we need to do a better
job” and ‘‘oh boy, we can’t continue to operate
this way” – in order to be as excellent in OHS
as in other aspects of the organization, and to
eliminate workers’ compensation surcharges
that could otherwise benefit clients.
1. HR manager already in place with OHS in
portfolio since 1994. He becomes a more
active KTL in OHS after interaction with con-
sultant. He has strong administrative and peo-
ple skills.
5. Consultant had ‘‘all the answers” to help
workplace improve its OHS management
and risk control measures.
The key evidence related to the BTC factor is included in the table. Numerical bullets indicate the order in time in which the concept appeared in the respective organizational narrative of breakthrough change. Thus, reading the
bullets in numerical order within each case is recommended for understanding the timeline and the causal linkages included in the text.
a Workwell audit by the workers’ compensation agency was a mandatory OHS management audit. Two attempts at achieving a pass on the audit were allowed, with a financial penalty resulting if the organization failed both
times.
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L.S. Robson et al. / Safety Science 86 (2016) 211–227 219and procedures, ensuring their implementation, organizing meet-
ings, coordinating and communicating with necessary others, and
following up on issues. Job titles of the KTL varied, with only two
explicitly involving OHS (Health, Safety & Environment Coordina-
tor; Process Engineer & Safety Coordinator; Owner; and Human
Resources Manager). In one case, the individual had substantial
formal training in OHS. In the others, the KTL became knowledge-
able through interaction with their key information sources (con-
sultants, corporate new hires), as well as existing documentation,
brief training courses, and informal sources. In all cases, multiple
interviewees pointed toward the KTL, some with strong statements
of attribution, such as ‘‘I mean it’s all her – there’s no doubt about
it.”P3 The KTLs shared the characteristics of competence in admin-
istration (e.g., ‘‘a very organized person,”P4 ‘‘good at writing pol-
icy”P5) and strength in people skills (e.g., ‘‘a very, very good
communicator. . .very persuasive. . .”P6). They were able to gain
the cooperation of and collaborate with workers, supervisors and
managers:
She’s very comfortable that way. She can, she can talk to a
worker – she’s very approachable. And then she can approach
supervisors or maintenance or whoever needs to be involved
that the situation has to change, right? She’s very approachable
on both ends, right?P7In Sections 4.3.1–4.3.3, we described the four elements involved
in the initiation of BTC. As indicated in Table 3, all four elements
were present in all cases, though their order of appearance varied.
We now present five other elements important to the occurrence
of BTC. These are concerned with the context and process of BTC.
Details for each case are found in Table 4.
4.3.4. Responsiveness to OHS concerns
A responsiveness of the organization to employee OHS concerns
emerged as a cross-case factor in three of the cases. Moreover, in
two of them, it was described as an important ‘‘catalyst”P8 to the
process of change, particularly with regards to enhancing
employee participation in OHS:
The one-to-one contact with operators about their health and
safety concerns, I think that that is huge and I don’t think that
can be overstated really . . .Tess5 was really good at getting back
to people and closing loops, and then getting more information
from people, and you know, it becomes a cycle right? Of people
being willing to talk more and to expect more; because they’ve
gotten this much, they expect more.P94.3.5. Positive social dynamics
A striking element in the model for the research team, and rep-
resented by three cases, is the broad concept of positive social (and
psychological) dynamics, which encompasses cross-case themes of
energizing interactions, rapport, collaboration, worker empower-
ment and development through OHS, and passion for and commit-
ment to OHS. This element had been unanticipated beforehand,
and no a priori codes were developed specifically for it, yet it
emerged strongly from the data.
4.3.5.1. Energizing interactions, rapport, collaboration and empower-
ment. Joint health and safety committee (JHSC) meetings went
from being ‘‘boring, crappy, dry”P10 to developing the ‘‘right
energy”P10 and becoming more ‘‘vibrant”P8. At one time it was dif-
ficult to get people to be on the committee and attend meetings.
After BTC, committee volunteers exceeded available positions;5 All names are pseudonyms.and in one organization, one-third of the staff attended the
bimonthly JHSC meetings.
The KTL empowered the members of the JHSC, encouraging
them to take on new responsibilities related to OHS (e.g. teaching
or reviewing hazard reports), and developed a collaborative rap-
port with them. For example, when a KTL was asked to take on a
corporate safety role auditing the plants elsewhere, he agreed on
the condition that the worker co-chair would be a co-auditor. As a
result, JHSC members felt ownership of the committee’s endeavors:
When we got to see all the really neat stuff that we really
needed to do, and, and it’s very rewarding in that, you know,
we had nothing, and the policies that we have now, and the
practices that we have now are significant, and they are to the
betterment of the [workplace], to union people...P10
They felt greater authority regarding OHS too:
That’s another thing that’s changed here, is we work more as a
unit now. Um, no, the supervisor does not have to listen to me,
but he does because we have, kind of like, we have each other’s
backs. . . we’re always . . .everybody’s doing the same thing.
We’re always looking out, we’re always watching for potential
you know, hazard, or whatever.P9
A collaborative approach was also taken with the entire work-
force, with workers and supervisors being consulted as changes
were planned and implemented. As a result, workers were no
longer ‘‘afraid to stand up for safety stuff”P8 and were ‘‘opening
up more and more every year.”P4
4.3.5.2. Passion for and commitment to OHS. Several JHSC members,
particularly the co-chairs, on both the employer and the worker
side, were strongly committed to and even passionate for OHS
improvements in their organizations. Here’s a recollection about
one worker co-chair:
I’m just remembering a moment . . . in the early years of our
safety committee meetings, and he would be so uh, almost furi-
ous when talking about how something isn’t done right, or it’s
not safe. . . . He was so passionate about it, he almost took the
approach like everyone was against him, you know, it was up
to him to fix it, but, again, you know, very passionate guy and,
and he did have a big impact on a regular basis. . ..I guess per-
sonality is, is a big part of it. A huge sense of purpose for sure,
you know, that it’s a . . . bigger picture.P114.3.6. Continuous improvement pattern
The continuous improvement pattern element of the model,
represented in all four cases, describes the ongoing pattern in
OHS management and risk reduction over time (‘‘continually
evolving”P12). Instead of there being an initial flurry of OHS-
related actions followed by stasis, there were instead ongoing
improvements being made, even though recent success in OHS
was perceived. For example, voluntary audits and program
reviews, some by external parties, were used to identify areas for
even further improvement. Tweaks to current OHS processes were
made to increase effectiveness or efficiency; and initiatives tar-
geted newly identified risks (e.g., cell phone use) in the absence
of pertinent legislation or an adverse event. This continuous
improvement approach was partly driven by the nature of the
management system in place in Metal Products and later on in
Social Agency, but also, and in all cases, by the attitudes toward
improvement:
. . .the mentality or the approach we took is that, we’re always
going to have safety issues. It’s not like they’re ever going to
disappear. The whole idea is we have safety issues going at a
Table 4
Summary of case evidence related to five elements of the BTC model concerned with context and process.
Organizational responsiveness Positive psychological and social dynamics Simultaneous operational
improvement
Supportive internal context Continuous improvement
pattern
Metal products  From her start in 2006, the KTL elicited
workers’ concerns, then addressed them
and communicated about progress,
thereby encouraging further participation.
 Later, the JHSC behaved in the same way as
the KTL.
 KTL was well-liked.
 KTL developed the capacity of the JHSC,
developed the ‘‘voice” of worker, broke
down the barrier between the office and
the shop floor.
 KTL increased worker participation and
trust by seeking their opinion and
responding to their concerns.
 KTL’s success in workplace was a signifi-
cant personal development, since it was
her first OHS management job after many
years as a front-line worker and a part-
time college student in OHS diploma
program.
 Worker co-chair of JHSC passionate about
safety (started in 2010).
 Starting in 2004, there were efforts
to improve general plant perfor-
mance, resulting in better adher-
ence to rules.
 Standardized operating proce-
dures were instituted in 2006 for
operational reasons, but also
incorporated safety aspects.
 Corporate and plant management
supportive of OHS in word (e.g.
speaking at safety meetings) and
deed (e.g. participating in OHS
inspections, approving large
OHS-related expenses).
 Employee relations good.
 Low turnover.
 Maintenance worked collabora-
tively with KTL.
 Various new initiatives
over time.
 KTL has learner mindset.
 OHS program based on
Plan-Do-Check-Act man-
agement system frame-
work because ISO
14001 used as the
template.
Plastics  Responsiveness of maintenance manager
to workers concerns expressed at JHSC
meetings, led to enhanced participation
and more ‘‘vibrant” meetings..
 Production manager who attended JHSC
meetings had transformational leadership
qualities.
 Worker co-chairs were empowered by KTL
and assumed increasing OHS responsibili-
ties over time (e.g. auditing, reviewing
hazard reports);.
 Employer and worker co-chairs worked
together collaboratively.
 JHSC became ‘‘vibrant” and better
attended.
 Two worker JHSC co-chairs with tenures
1999–2003 and 2003–2011 were passion-
ate about safety.
 Housekeeping intervention initi-
ated for operational reasons, but
this may have benefited safety too.
 Better control of processes con-
tributed to safety indirectly too:
less ‘‘chaos” meant less time pres-
sure; and more slack meant more
time available for safety.
 Corporate and plant management
were supportive of OHS (gave for-
mal part-time OHS responsibili-
ties to engineer and allowed
worker co-chair to spend time on
OHS).
 Owner ‘‘never said no” to OHS-
related requests.
 Employee relations good.
 Low turnover.
 Maintenance responded to OHS
concerns promptly and attended
safety meetings.
 New initiatives on an
ongoing basis; new
objectives made
annually.
 Ongoing experimenta-
tion with better ways of
doing things.
 Voluntary external audit
undertaken for learning
purposes.
Grocery  Company acted on employee OHS concerns
‘‘right away”.
 This case was not counted as contributing
evidence to support this element of the BTC
model, but the case was nevertheless consis-
tent: the KTL/owner appeared to have good
rapport with employees and with the exter-
nal consultant; and the owner advanced the
career of cashier by designating her as OHS
coordinator.
 This case was not counted as con-
tributing evidence to support this
element of the BTC model. There
was no evidence of operational
improvement, nor evidence of poor
or deteriorating operations.
 Franchise owner (who was also
worked in the operation) initiated
the BTC change, including new
expenditures on OHS consultation
services and new equipment.
 Employee relations were good.
 Low turnover in full-time
positions.
 Information updates by
contracted OHS consul-
tant, who met with JHSC
quarterly.
 Annual program assess-
ment and report by OHS
consultant.
Social agency  This case was not counted as contributing
evidence to support this element of the BTC
model, but the case was nevertheless consis-
tent: over time, the firm enhanced respon-
siveness to property maintenance issues
(and thus OHS issues too) by hiring 2 full-
time maintenance staff instead of contracting
out and by adding the property maintenance
manager to the JHSC.
 Employer and worker co-chairs worked
collaboratively.
 JHSC developed ‘‘right energy” and seen by
others as driving force.
 OHS activities led to new leadership
opportunities among front-line and super-
visory staff.
 Employer co-chair was ‘‘very enthusiastic”
about the JHSC as a result of interaction
with consultant.
 Organization in general strove for
excellence – achieved accredita-
tion for service excellence for the
first time in 2007, which furthered
OHS program.
 Senior management was support-
ive of OHS.
 Employee relations were good.
 Low turnover.
 Maintenance function became
better resourced and responsive
over time.
 Evidence of new initia-
tives over time, under-
taken proactively.
 Results of a voluntary
external OHS audit-like
assessment drove
actions taken in subse-
quent years.
 Accreditation, under-
taken part way through
the BTC period, involved
adopting a continuous
improvement approach
to risk management.
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L.S. Robson et al. / Safety Science 86 (2016) 211–227 221higher, higher level all the time . . .– you know we get rid of the
issues and move on to the next issue right? And so . . . you know
now we’re almost sort of looking for things. . .You know, it’s not
easy, it’s still not easy right? It’s, it’s an ongoing and sometimes
you know, like we say we get the fire going, and so we’ve got to
keep adding more wood to the fire right?P84.3.7. Simultaneous improvement in operations
Improvement in the organizations with regards to their core
operations, found in three of the cases, had some direct effects on
OHS hazards and practices. For example, inmanufacturing, a house-
keeping intervention, implemented in part for operational reasons,
also reduced tripping hazards. In Social Agency, lifts were increas-
ingly acquired to address the needs of new clients, but they also
reduced biomechanical loads for service providers. Further, when
the agency underwent accreditation as ameans to improve its oper-
ations, it was required to develop further in areas broader than but
inclusive of OHS, such as emergency planning, risk management,
and organizational performance measurement. Improvement in
operations had indirect effects on OHS risks too. In onemanufactur-
ingorganization, better control over processesmeant ‘‘the guyswer-
en’t always running around,”P8 and therefore had more time to
‘‘think about”P13 safety during work tasks and come up with solu-
tions to safety problems. Similarly, in the othermanufacturing facil-
ity, new leadership had forced a distinct shift in operational
practices, such as improved adherence to and standardization of
operational procedures, enhanced accountability, and better ‘‘clos-
ing of loops,”P9 and this discipline benefited safety too.
4.3.8. Supportive internal context
The element of supportive organizational context, found in all
four cases, is based on several cross-case themes, including senior
management support for OHS, good employee-management rela-
tions, relatively low employee turnover and a maintenance group
responsive to OHS concerns. These various aspects of the organiza-
tional environment, all conducive to OHS performance improve-
ment, either preceded or coincided with BTC.
4.3.8.1. Senior management support. Senior management support
for OHS during and after the BTC period was widely perceived by
employees. This support was conveyed by various means: senior
management’s communication about OHS in meetings, their atten-
dance at safety meetings, their support for OHS-related purchases
(‘‘never said no”P8), the creation of new OHS-related positions, and
allowing time forOHS-relatedactivities. This supporthadnotalways
been there during the pre-BTC period. A correlation between pro-
gress in OHS and plant managers was observed by one long tenure
employee:
The different attitudes that the [plant] managers had, I think
had a big, big factor, played a big factor in, in how things [re-
garding safety] were, you know, advanced.P34.3.8.2. Good employee-management relations. Employee-
management relations were viewed positively by workers (e.g.,
‘‘excellent”P10) and, in the unionized workplaces, grievances were
seldom filed. Senior managers were well regarded and trusted by
workers (‘‘a good man”P3). The distance inherent in the job hierar-
chy was minimized by managers being ‘‘really friendly,”P14 ‘‘kind of
humble,”P9 and having an ‘‘open-door policy.”P4,P10 Some organiza-
tions had poorer relations at some point prior to BTC, but these
improved before or coincident with BTC.
4.3.8.3. Turnover. Workplaces had relatively low turnover at the
time of BTC. Even the grocery store had stability among itssupervisory and full-time staff, as well as some part-time staff.
This was viewed as favouring health and safety because of the
accumulation of expertise about risks:
And so what you have is, you have a group of people who are
used to working together, a group of people who are used to
working on the equipment that we operate, and, as they
become more astute in their jobs, they also become more aware
of potential dangers.P15
In addition, supervisors were said to have more time to deal
with OHS issues when their team was more experienced and thus
requiring less oversight. In contrast, pre-BTC periods of high turn-
over among workers or management were described as a ‘‘big
handcuff”P3 on safety.
4.3.8.4. Responsive maintenance group. By the end of the BTC period,
organizations had a maintenance group that was responsive to
OHS concerns. This was important for risk reduction, since newly
identified hazards were quickly addressed. It also made a contribu-
tion to the dynamics of the BTC process, by contributing to the
Organizational Responsiveness element discussed above:
So then about the late 90s, or early 2000s, it started becoming a
little bit more vibrant you know, with the meetings – came to
participate a little bit more in the sense that people started see-
ing things getting done. Like I said, with [the maintenance man-
ager] managing some of the stuff, you know, [a worker] would
say stuff and things would get done. And so then when we had
safety meetings, people. . .they’d start participating a little bit
more with it, and seeing things actually changing right? A little,
sort of just a little bit of the catalyst.P8
Having the maintenance manager be a member of the JHSC
helped ensure organizational responsiveness to worker OHS con-
cerns. Another way was through ready collaboration of the mainte-
nance manager with the OHS lead in the organization when
addressing OHS-related issues.
We turn now to the three outcome elements in the model,
which were represented in all four cases.
4.3.9. Integrated OHS knowledge
Integrated OHS knowledge was manifested in multiple ways at
each site (see Table 5 for details). These included the inclusion of
OHS in employee performance management; new policies, proce-
dures, documentation and record-keeping; and the adoption of
new OHS-related practices among managerial and front-line staff,
including new and increased communication of OHS information,
enhanced hazard identification, and safer work practices.
4.3.10. Decreased OHS risk
Decreased OHS Risk was achieved in multiple and varied ways
in each of the four cases. Table 5 shows that in each workplace, risk
reduction measures spanned the hierarchy of risk controls (OHSAS
Project Group, 2007), including elimination or substitution, engi-
neering controls, signage/warnings and/or administrative controls
and personal protective equipment. This change was obvious to
others:
It’s a completely different plant out there – with all the guarding
we have, and safety poles and, each area we have different rules,
and where something can be stacked, and how high it can be
stacked, and so on and so on.P44.3.11. Decreased injury & illness
Our extracts of the workers’ compensation agency data showed
declines in firm claim rates that were large in both a within-sector
222 L.S. Robson et al. / Safety Science 86 (2016) 211–227inter-firm sense (the basis of case selection) and a within-firm
sense (Fig. 1) for the four cases. We were able to validate that these
were substantial changes with the primary data collected. First,
injury rate data held internally by the organization was found to
be consistent with the external sources in terms of their injury-
rate-versus-time patterns. Second, in the time period following
BTC, organizations were found to regularly receive rebates from
the workers’ compensation agency, indicating better-than-sector-
average performance in the previous year. In contrast, before
BTC, they were receiving either lower rebates or even surcharges,
or were subject to the mandatory Workwell audit, which targeted
poorer-than-sector-average performers. As well, all organizations
belonging to a corporation had indications of being in good stand-
ing in OHS, relative to other units within the same corporate entity
(e.g., invitations to help other units in OHS).4.4. Consistency of findings in in-depth cases with the larger pool of
BTC cases
Having derived the BTC model from the in-depth case data, the
question arises as to the consistency of thatmodel with the findings
from the remaining eight BTC cases identified through the brief
screening interviews. The shallow nature of the brief interview data
limitswhat canbe said in this regard,but a fewobservationscannev-
ertheless be made. First, one of the key features of the model, the
entry of newOHSknowledge is supportedby the larger pool of cases.
As Table A1 shows, seeking external expertise was common, docu-
mented in nine of the 12 cases. This increases to 10 of the 12 cases
with the addition of the learning from the in-depth study. Second,
like the in-depth cases, the remaining eight cases all had evidence
of improvement in both OHSmanagement and risk controls (deter-
mined by a post-hoc review of the interview summaries). Third, the
four in-depth cases all showed external influence(s) enhancing the
motivation of the organizations to improve in OHS; and across the
12 BTC cases, this pattern was seen in at least six of the nine cases
where information in this domain was available. However, we note
that oneof the12 cases appeared to illustrate an alternative inwhich
organizational motivation was enhanced by an internal influence
instead. In that case, the OHS department focused on developing
‘‘good” OHS performance measures, gained the support of more
senior management, and then reported the data to the Board of
Directors. This then increased the Board’s interest in and support
for financial commitments to OHS improvements.5. Discussion
This study developed a 12-element conceptual model of large
workplace improvement in OHS based on the research findings
from four systematically selected cases. In the model, improve-
ment is initiated in response to influences in the external environ-
ment and requires the presence of three elements internally:
organizational motivation to improve in OHS, new OHS knowledge,
and a talented ‘‘knowledge transformation leader” who orches-
trates the integration of that new knowledge into the organization.
By the end of BTC, the organization has enhanced its management
of OHS, adopted new management and worker practices, and
reduced its OHS risks. This transformation is facilitated by positive
social and psychological phenomena, as well as organizational
responsiveness to employee OHS concerns, a continuous improve-
ment pattern of OHS activity, simultaneous operational improve-
ment, and a supportive workplace context.
Considering the results at a high level, we note that none of the
BTC narratives had a ‘‘magic bullet” remedy for improving OHS
performance. Instead, multiple organizational actions were
involved, and most were concerned with the primary preventionof injury and illness. No doubt some of these actions were more
important to reducing risk than others, but our methods do not
allow us to apportion attribution. Our finding is consistent with
that of Hale et al. (2010) in a study of 17 organizations: a higher
number of independent intervention sub-components were associ-
ated with success. Indeed, this multiplicity might in itself be
important, as has been found in a recent review of the general
organizational change literature (Martins, 2011), and as could be
expected when intervening in a system.
5.1. BTC as a special case of organizational learning
An influx of new OHS knowledge and its transformation into
new or modified responsibilities, policies, procedures and practices
for both managers and workers was found to be at the core of the
BTC process. The process therefore resembles a special, OHS-
specific case of organizational learning. As such, existing theory
in the organizational learning field may be relevant to understand-
ing the BTC findings. For example, the concept of absorptive capac-
ity has been conceived of as the ability of an organization to
identify, assimilate, transform and exploit knowledge from the envi-
ronment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2006; Volberda
et al., 2010; Zahra and George, 2002). Distinguishing among these
four sub-processes may be useful when describing and analyzing
change in organizational knowledge about OHS. Our cases illus-
trate how new OHS knowledge may be identified and assimilated,
but not yield performance improvement until it is transformed and
exploited. That is, two of the cases went through a mandatory
provincial OHS management audit program a few years before
the BTC period. They failed a first audit; then, in response, identified
new OHS knowledge and assimilated it in the form of new policy
and procedure documentation, allowing them to pass on a second
audit. However, the more significant changes in organizational
routines and thus OHS outcomes came later, during the BTC period,
once knowledge had been fully transformed and exploited, as a
result of the additional presence of organizational motivation to
improve OHS and a knowledge transformation leader (KTL).
Indeed, our cases revealed a pivotal role for the KTLs in the
organizations’ absorption of new OHS knowledge. The KTLs had
productive interactions with external OHS management consul-
tants, learned new OHS concepts, and then disseminated and
embedded that new OHS knowledge internally, by interacting as
required with individuals from across the organization. The KTLs
were notably adept at working collaboratively and communicating
with others in the organization. They were described as being able
to reach across the job hierarchy and achieve trust in their relation-
ships. As a result, senior management gave the KTLs the authority
to act, and others gave the KTLs their co-operation. The KTLs there-
fore resemble the boundary spanners described in the organiza-
tional learning literature (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Tushman,
1977; Volberda et al., 2010). These are people who span the bound-
aries between the organization and the external environment, and
between different organizational sub-units. That is, they are a con-
duit for knowledge transfer from the external environment to the
internal environment and also within their own organization.
Research has shown that boundary spanners are a determinant
of an organization’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal,
1990; Volberda et al., 2010). Broberg and Hermund (2007) have
noted the boundary spanner role that external OHS consultants
may play; the present study now newly highlights the importance
of that role for an internal change agent.
5.2. BTC may be propelled by organizational energy
During our analysis we were struck by the repeated occurrences
of positive social and psychological phenomena: energizing
Table 5
Summary of the case evidence related to the BTC model outcomes integrated OHS knowledge and decreased OHS risk.
Integrated OHS knowledge Decreased OHS risk
Metal products  New EHS coordinator position.
 Supervisors with more day-to-day responsibility for
safety.
 Enhanced enforcement of and compliance with OHS
rules, including PPE use.
 New OHS policies & procedures.
 More 2-way supervisor-worker communication on the
floor.
 More frequent educational safety meetings.
 Analyses of job tasks and of incidents by coordinator.
 More hazard identification and reporting by workers.
 More frequent and extensive training of workers and
JHSC members.
 New standardized operational procedures (SOPs) with
embedded safety precautions developed and adopted.
 Substitution of tools and equipment.
 Engineering controls (e.g., guarding, limit switches, safety poles/mesh/wrapping to
support material, rearrangement of work layout to create more space, lighter loads
for lifting, new cranes, dust collector, welding fume collection, welding curtains).
 Enhanced signage and warning systems.
 More SOPs at all work stations.
 Training and education more frequent, comprehensive, and with more follow up
on the floor.
 Additional/ improved PPE.
Plastics  Engineer given formal responsibility for OHS for first
time.
 Accountability for OHS enhanced through performance
reviews and, rarely, discipline.
 Managers enforcing safety rules more, including PPE
use.
 New OHS policies and procedures.
 Internal auditing of OHS management.
 Analysis of OHS incident data.
 More communication about OHS on floor and in opera-
tional meetings.
 More safety meetings, with better attendance.
 Workers reporting OHS concerns and participating in
inspections more.
 More training of supervisors and workers in OHS.
 Workers adopt safer practices.
 Elimination of some knife use by changing box closure.
 Substitution to safer box cutter.
 Engineering controls (added staircase to higher portions of machinery, improved
guarding, better lighting, dust collector).
 New lockout/tagout procedures; speed maximums and use of seat belts on tow
motors set and enforced.
 Greater amount and interactivity of training for workers and supervisors.
 Better quality PPE.
Grocery  New de facto safety coordinator position created.
 Managers given new OHS inspection duties.
 Managers enforcing safety rules more, including PPE
use, through frequent communication about safety on
the floor.
 New policies and procedures.
 More OHS in orientation training.
 Workers adopt safer practices.
 Substitution of tools and equipment (new stands, freezers and box cutters).
 Engineering (automatic truck chocking system).
 New procedures (e.g. material handling practices, tow motor usage, violence
prevention).
 New signage (strong warning near compactor).
 Enhanced orientation training and retraining of existing staff.
 New PPE requirement (safety shoes).
Social agency  New site inspection duties distributed among workers
at all sites.
 New OHS policies & procedures.
 OHS data monitored through new annual organizational
performance reports.
 New return-to-work procedures Implemented by
supervisors.
 OHS included in operational meetings.
 More extensive OHS training introduced.
 New client-specific risk assessment and handling prac-
tices adopted.
 Elimination (trip hazards fixed).
 Engineering (lift equipment added).
 Administrative (no-lift practices, less use of physical restraints, emergency prepa-
ration, cell phone and driving policy, pre-use vehicle check, tailored behavioral and
client handling plans for each client, enhanced training for new and existing
employees).
 PPE against infectious agents.
L.S. Robson et al. / Safety Science 86 (2016) 211–227 223interactions, especially with regards to JHSC meetings; collaborative
rapport; empowerment; individual and committee development;
and individual passion for OHS. Such concepts were not well rep-
resented in our original coding scheme, but emerged through the
analysis process. Only upon expanding our initial reading of the
organizational change literature did we realize that there was a
conceptual ‘‘home” for these observations – that of positive organi-
zational scholarship (see Section 2). The implication of the emerg-
ing theory and empirical results from the POS field is that a greater
occurrence of positive social and psychological phenomena in the
BTC firms might explain in part their superior change in perfor-
mance relative to peer organizations. In particular, positive inter-
actions may have led to greater organizational energy, which in
turn hastened organizational change. Notably, the KTL was a major
figure in the positive phenomena.
This finding about positive phenomena resonates with other
findings about organizational change processes in the OHS litera-
ture. For instance, two of the four main themes Hale et al. (2010)found important in explaining successful change in organizations
were ‘‘energy, creativity, and support” and ‘‘engagement and
empowerment of the workforce in a learning/change process.”
Moreover, with regards to the first of these, the authors reported
that among the safety professionals from the 17 organizations of
the study, the three most ‘‘active, persistent and creative” of the
professionals each belonged to one of the five most clearly success-
ful organizations. Furthermore, these authors were especially
struck by ‘‘the importance of the energy from the ‘motor’ of the
coordinator,” in light of the focus in the safety literature on senior
management and supervisor leadership. In another pertinent
study, Hasle and Jensen (2006) found four sources of explanation
for successful change among their cases. Two are relevant here:
‘‘development of a powerful coalition,” which refers to securing
support at various levels of the organization; and ‘‘control of social
dynamics.” Within the authors’ findings, this latter theme was
rooted in the OHS change agent’s ability to address resistance to
change, but their definition of social dynamics, ‘‘emotions and
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allows for more positive interpretations too. A final resonant exam-
ple comes from an analysis of the factors associated with the
unusually safe construction activities of the London 2012 Olympics
facilities (Bolt et al., 2012, p. vii): ‘‘A common thread through all
aspects of the build success is the people and their focused and col-
laborative interactions.”
Organizational responsiveness to employee OHS concerns was
presented as a separate element of the model. This element could
arguably be subsumed within the positive social phenomena ele-
ment, but was kept separate because of its possible special role
of ‘‘catalyst” in the process of change, particularly with regards
to the engagement of employee involvement. Findings from two
other case study research projects also point to the importance
of responsiveness to OHS intervention success (Hale et al., 2010,
p. 1033; Gunningham and Sinclair, 2009, p. 891). We note that
‘‘employee involvement leading to organizational responsiveness
leading to further employee involvement” may be an example of
a ‘‘reinforcing loop” found in system dynamic models of safety sys-
tem processes, which until now have focused on system break-
down (Kontogiannis, 2012; Marais et al., 2006). Further research
should further explore the importance and role of responsiveness.
It offers promise to workplaces that find it a challenge to engage
employees in OHS.
5.3. External influences precipitate BTC initiation
Our in-depth cases all revealed external influences contributing
to the initiation of BTC by being sources of OHS knowledge and
especially in motivating improvement in OHS. Similarly, external
influences often appear in generic models of organizational change
(e.g., Burke and Litwin, 1992; Spangenberg and Theron, 2013). The
nature of external influences found in this study were diverse and
spanned the three categories of Vedung’s (1998) typology for pol-
icy instruments of ‘‘carrots, sermons and sticks,” which has
recently been applied to OHS (Hasle et al., 2014). While these
results should be confirmed with large sample sizes, they suggest
that the current use by regulatory authorities of multiple and var-
ied approaches may be most appropriate.
5.4. Role of OHS management standards in change process
We note that among the four cases there was no perceptible
influence of national or international OHS management standards
(e.g. CSA Z1000, OHSAS 18001). Instead, the audit criteria associ-
ated with the mandatory Workwell program of the workers’ com-
pensation authority appeared to be the most influential. These
criteria were based on legislation, regulations and some additional
good OHS management practices identified through consensus
among OHS professionals in Ontario. The Workwell auditing pro-
gram, which no longer exists, targeted firms performing poorly in
OHS, requiring them to either pass its OHS management audit in
two tries or be fined. As such, the program’s criteria provided a
compelling benchmark for employers and those consulting to
them. For example, the OHS program developed by the private con-
sultant for Grocery aimed to ‘‘get you ready for a Workwell” even
though the company was not scheduled to undergo a Workwell
audit. Similarly, when Plastics decided in the later part of their
BTC change period to seek general feedback from a private consul-
tant, the Workwell audit criteria were chosen. As well, not surpris-
ingly, when Metal Products and Plastics were required to undergo
the Workwell auditing program just prior to their respective BTC
periods, their early OHS documentation was developed with the
aim of meeting the Workwell requirements. Thus, while other
information sources were ultimately drawn upon, the Workwell
content was an early input for both manufacturing organizations.5.5. Limitations
The use of just four in-depth cases limits the generalizability of
the findings. However, within the constraints inherent in this lim-
itation, we maximized the potential generalizability by (i) selecting
cases from a large population of organizational entities using a
thorough and systematic method, (ii) selecting four cases for in-
depth study from a diversity of industrial sectors (iii) finding that
the four in-depth cases are reflective of the larger pool of 12 BTC
cases in the nature of their changes (i.e. Table A1) and (iv) requir-
ing the BTC factors to be present in at least three of the four cases
studied to be included in the model. It could be argued that 12 BTC
cases are outliers and lessons learned from such ‘‘outliers” will not
generalize to others. We address this concern by noting that the
pool of 12 BTC cases is similar in size and sector to the 2599 firms
in the initial study sample. More importantly, work in other fields
has demonstrated that the study of positive deviants in a popula-
tion has yielded knowledge applicable to non-deviants in the pop-
ulation (Lavine, 2012; Marsh et al., 2004; Pascale and Sternin,
2005; Spreitzer and Sonenshein, 2003).
It should also be kept in mind that these findings are based on
organizational entities with 60–240 employees andmay be less rel-
evant for much smaller or larger entities. That said, three of the four
caseswerealsopart ofmulti-site corporateentitiesandso the results
may also be relevant at the site-levelwithin a larger entity. The find-
ings are alsomost relevant for organizationsmoving from the lower
50% to the top20%of their industrial sectorswith respect toOHSper-
formance, andwould likelybe less relevant for organizationsmaking
other transitions (e.g., from the 20th to second percentile). We also
note that the internal contexts in the BTC organizations were sup-
portive of OHS improvement, including senior management being
supportive of OHS and good management-employee relations. It
couldbe that the elements of amodel forOHS improvement in a con-
text of unsupportive senior management and poor management-
employee relations would differ somewhat from those in Fig. 2.
Finally, the measure of OHS performance used to screen organiza-
tions was WSIB claims, which are mostly based on work-related
traumatic physical injuries and musculoskeletal disorders. Most
OHS knowledge absorption by the organizations was therefore con-
cerned with injury prevention. Our findings may therefore be less
relevant to other aspects of occupational health, such as chemical
exposures and mental health.
Our methods of case and participant selection may have intro-
duceda bias towardfinding, as a BTCelement, a knowledge transfor-
mation leader with strong administrative and people skills. First, in
all four cases, the KTLwas the same person as the organizational key
informant who participated in the initial brief screening interview
and indicated a preliminary willingness to participate in a case
study. This screening step, involving interaction with an unknown
external person, is a ‘‘boundary spanning” activity in itself, which
mayhave selected for thosemore inclined toward such activity. Sec-
ond, in planning the case study data collectionwith researchers, the
key informant had some discretion in choosing interviewees.
Although researchers sent a list of roles and somecouldonly befilled
by one specific individual (e.g., JHSC worker co-chair), others were
more generic and could be filled by several individuals (e.g., long-
tenure front-line worker). To the extent that the key informant had
latitude in selecting interviewees, he or shemay have preferentially
selected those with whom they had a good rapport. This may have
exaggerated the study’s observations of good people skills in the
KTL and the BTC factor of positive social dynamics.
The largest limitation for this research is the lack of contrasting
cases, i.e., those that continued to be among the worst 50% of firms
in their respective sectors, instead of moving to the top 20%. Inclu-
sion of these cases would have allowed further validation of the
identified BTC elements or revealed their interaction with other
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step in an ongoing program of research.
5.6. Future research
Future research could use the BTC elements identified here as
sensitizing concepts (Bowen, 2006) in studies of organizational
improvement in OHS. Other relevant concepts identified in the Dis-
cussion (i.e., absorptive capacity, boundary spanner, and organiza-
tional energy) should also be considered.
Future research could address the limitations of the present
project by studying additional BTC cases and matched ‘‘little-or-
no change” cases. Based on the findings from this study, we hold
the following hypotheses about ‘‘little-or-no-change” (LNC) cases,
relative to BTC cases: (a) they have had a weaker presence or even
absence of one or more of the three required internal initiating ele-
ments (organizational motivation, new OHS knowledge, and
knowledge transformation leader), (b) their person(s) in the
(potential) knowledge transformation leader role have weaker
administrative or people skills, (c) they are less responsive to
worker OHS concerns, (d) they have undergone less improvement
operationally, (e) they have had a less supportive context (consid-
ering aspects of senior management support, labour-management
relations, turnover, and maintenance), (f) they did not sustain their
OHS efforts over time, (g) they have made less substantive changes
to OHS policies, procedures, responsibilities, documentation and
individual knowledge, (h) and their risks have been controlled to
a lesser extent. With regards to external influences, we have com-
peting hypotheses. It could be that LNC cases have had less exter-
nal influences acting upon them than the BTC cases. It could also be
that LNC cases have the same external influences but responded to
them differently. Future studies could also examine the extent to
which the current findings are relevant to smaller enterprises.
Another enhancement would be prospective data collection on
a large cohort of organizations, using both qualitative and quanti-
tative data collection and analyses. Of course, there are large
resource challenges with such designs, but we suggest that a sam-
pling frame enriched with organizations poised to make a wide
range of OHS improvements, but expected to have varied success
(e.g., companies entering an OHS improvement program with wide
scope), could enhance the efficiency of data collection.
6. Conclusions
This study drew the following conclusions about organizations
moving from among the highest 50% in their industrial sector, with
regards to workers’ compensation claim rate, to among the lowestTable A1
Most common types of internal changes reported among the twelve BTC cases.
Type of change in firm reported as contributing to decreased workers’ compensation
Education/training in primary prevention improved
External expertise obtained (e.g. consultant)
OHS personnel added through hiring or reassignment
Tool/equipment/machinery changes made
Return-to-work program implemented/enhanced
OHS policy and/or procedures enhanced
Joint health and safety committee became more active/intense
Culture changed
Hazard identification enhanced (general, ergonomic)
Performance management for OHS enhanced (performance evaluation, disciplinary a
System auditing introduced
Management made OHS a priority
Safer work procedures introduced
Contractors selected using OHS criteria
OHS data reported to senior management/Board of Directors
New OHS information systems introduced
Analysis of injury data increased20% (over a decade), based on the in-depth study of four systemat-
ically selected cases and a more shallow study of eight other cases:
 The internal elements necessary for the initiation of this type of
improvement include organizational motivation to improve in
OHS, new OHS knowledge, and a leader at the mid- or senior-
level of the organization with both administrative and rela-
tional skills (the ‘‘knowledge transformation leader”).
 External influences, of varied types, are associated with initia-
tion of this type of improvement, especially with regards to
organizational motivation to improve in OHS.
 Other internal elements associated with this type of improve-
ment include:
 Organizational responsiveness to worker OHS concerns.
 Positive social and psychological dynamics.
 Continuous improvement approach to OHS.
 Simultaneous operational improvement.
 Favourable internal context (i.e. senior management sup-
port, good employee relations, low turnover, responsive
maintenance function).
Further research must be done to establish the generalizability of
these conclusions.
The study also suggests theory in the areas of organizational
learning and positive organizational scholarship may be especially
relevant to understanding OHS improvement processes. Promising
concepts from these literatures are absorptive capacity, boundary
spanner and organizational energy.
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